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Abstract Home-sellers may not occupy their property when listed for sale.
While previous research has analyzed the effect of a vacancy on
the sales price of residential properties, no research to date has
quantiﬁed the economic beneﬁts and costs of renting vis-a `-vis
leaving a property vacant while listed for sale. Renting a property
will produce revenue but perhaps at the cost of a lower sale price
and/or longer time on the market. This paper employs data on
55,202 homes sold in the Las Vegas, Nevada area to determine
if renting a property increases or decreases the wealth position
of home sellers. The results of an empirical test of the model are
used to quantify the wealth effect. The ﬁndings indicate that
renting the property produces a signiﬁcant reduction in the home
seller’s wealth position.
Introduction
Homeowners are often faced with the prospect of having to relocate prior to the
sale of their residence. In such cases they will have to make a decision to either
rent the property or leave it vacant while it is listed for sale. Also, owners who
have rented their property for an extended time may decide to sell it. They must
decide whether or not to allow the current tenants to remain in the property while
it is listed for sale. Sellers would ideally rent or leave the property vacant
depending on whichever maximizes their wealth position. Renting the property
will produce income but perhaps at the expense of extending the time on the
market (TOM). There is also the question of the effect of a vacant or tenant-
occupied property on its ultimate sale price.
The next part of the paper reviews the literature regarding the effect of vacancy
on house prices and TOM. This review will also include a discussion of research
on seller motivation and other determinants of TOM. Next, a simple model of the
vacant/rental wealth maximizing decision will be presented, followed by an
empirical estimation of the parameters of the model. The wealth effects of the
vacant/rental decision are then estimated, which is followed by concluding
remarks.26  Clauretie and Wolverton
 Review of the Literature
Time on the Market
There are various factors that have been hypothesized to affect the time a
residential property is on the market. They include the listing price, the expected
sale price, seller motivation, property characteristics, and whether or not the
property is vacant. Most research has conﬁrmed the notion that TOM is positively
related to price. That is, the seller is able to extract a higher price only if he or
she is patient and is willing to allow the property to be on the market longer.
Additionally, higher priced (i.e., larger) homes generally take longer to sell than
lower priced (i.e., smaller) homes. This results in the well-known positive price-
TOM relationship.
Belkin, Hempel and McLeavey (1976) found that, overall, property characteristics
failed to explain TOM. Their TOM regressions against house features showed
generally low predictability even though some house characteristics were
associated with a longer TOM. Later, Haurin (1988) used a measure of the
‘‘atypicality’’ of house characteristics to help explain TOM in Columbus, OH. His
atypicality measure contrasted the ‘‘value’’ of the various characteristics of each
property to the average value (of those same characteristics) of all properties. His
reasoning was that atypical houses require a larger variance in the distribution of
offers in order to sell the house. He found a positive relationship between their
atypical measure and TOM. Using a similar measure of atypicality, Glower, Haurin
and Hendershott (1995) also found that houses (in Columbus, OH) with atypical
features take longer to sell. They also found that seller motivation mattered. They
noticed that as the time approached a planned ‘‘move’’ date, the seller moves
‘‘down’’ the price-TOM curve.
Kang and Gardner (1989) also found little relationship between housing features
and TOM. They did conclude that TOM was longer for over-priced homes and
older properties. They also conﬁrmed the positive price-TOM relationship. Ferreira
and Sirmans (1989) analyzed the price-TOM relationship during a period in which
ﬁnancing premiums were popular.1 They found that house sellers were willing to
give up a portion of the ﬁnancing premium in order to reduce the TOM. Asabere,
Huffman and Mehdian (1993) hypothesized that there is an optimal TOM and that
overpricing a property at listing leads to a greater TOM than optimal while the
reverse is true for under pricing a property.
Vacancy
As did others, Zuehlke (1987) found that the physical features of a house failed
to explain TOM. He also found that a vacant house extended the TOM but only
after approximately four months on the market. Springer (1996) found that
between 1989 and 1993 in Arlington, TX, vacancy reduced the ﬁnal selling priceLeave Vacant or Rent  27
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of a house by approximately 2.5%: 2.6% for lower priced houses and about 1%
for higher priced houses. Anglin, Rutherford and Springer (2003) also found that
vacancy matters. In their Arlington, TX 1996–1997 sample, vacant properties sold
for approximately 2% less than those that were owner-occupied. Vacancy also
increased the TOM for these properties by approximately 14% (about eight days).
Cowart and Peng (2003) found that vacant houses in Lexington, KY sold for
approximately 6% less that their owner-occupied counterparts.
Tenant Occupied Homes
With one exception, none of the previous studies of the price-TOM relationship
have looked at the effect of tenant occupancy on the sale price of a listed property.
The one study was Springer (1996). Included in his regressions was a dummy
variable, TENANT, equal to one if rented. He does not discuss the effect of this
variable, however. The coefﬁcient (.3191) appears to indicate that tenant-
occupied properties sell for about 27% less than owner-occupied properties. This
result, alone, would suggest that renting a property is sub-optimal.
Research suggests that vacant properties sell for less and appear to have an
extended TOM. In order to understand the wealth effect of the rent versus vacant
decision, the decision of a homeowner to rent a property if it would otherwise be
vacant during the listing period is modeled and empirically tested. The next section
discussed a simple wealth-maximizing model of the decision.
 A Simple Model of the Decision to Rent
In this model let:2
C  cH, the per day carrying cost (in dollars) of the house, where H is the value
of the house and c is percent;
R  rH, the per day rental value of the house, where r is a percent;
Hv  Price of the house when sold, if vacant;
Hr  Price of the house when sold, if rented;
Dv  Days on the market if vacant; and
Dr  Days on the market if rented.
Next, assume, for the moment, that C  R. If the homeowner leaves the house
vacant, the wealth position is: Hv  CDv. If the homeowner rents the house, the
wealth position is: Hr  (C  R)Dr. The homeowner should rent the property if:
H  (C  R)D  H  CD . (1) rr vv
This can be rearranged as:28  Clauretie and Wolverton
(H  H )  RD  C(D  D ). (2) r v rr v
Thus, the property should be rented when the sum of the earned rents and the
difference in house values is greater than the incremental carrying cost of the
rented property. The ﬁnal wealth position of the homeowner is:
(H  H )  RD C(D  D ). (3) r v rr v
The parameters in Equation (3) are empirically tested in the next section.
 Data and Empirical Results
The data includes 55,202 homes sold in the Las Vegas, NV area market during
an approximate three-year period from January 2001 through March 2004. Houses
selling for less than $100,000 or more than $600,000 were excluded to control
for a high degree of obsolescence or for luxury or custom homes. Houses on lots
greater than one acre in area were also excluded to control for the inﬂuence of
excess land. The data includes the following variables: sale price, time on market
(days), improved living area (square feet), home age (years), lot size (square feet),
bedroom and bath counts, number of garage stalls, existence of a pool and number
of ﬁreplaces. In addition, the data includes variables identifying occupancy as
being either owner-occupied (33,013 sales), tenant-occupied (1,866 sales), or
vacant (20,323 sales) at the time the property was listed for sale.3 The data are
more fully described in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 2 facilitates comparisons of variable means by time period. In addition to
the full data set, three time periods are relevant to later analysis: sales occurring
in 2001, 2002 and 2003/2004 (2003 plus the ﬁrst quarter of 2004). As Exhibit 2
demonstrates, there were no signiﬁcant differences in the physical characteristics
or occupancy status of the properties sold during the three time periods. Only
price and TOM differed signiﬁcantly, indicative of changes in the market rather
than the properties sold. Hence, varying outcomes of analyses of the effect of
tenant occupancy by time period presented later in the paper are not likely to have
been affected by the physical and occupancy makeup of the time-period-of-sale
subsamples.
Analysis of the Full Data Set
Exhibit 3 presents the empirical results of a house price model covering the full
55,202 observation data set. The price model regresses the natural log of price on
land area and improvement characteristics as well as TOM and occupancy (tenantLeave Vacant or Rent  29
JRER  Vol. 28  No. 1 – 2006
Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Sum
Price 195,418 84,651 100,000 600,000
Living Area (SF) 1,870 679 404 8,897
Bedrooms 3.38 0.77 1 9
Bathrooms 2.50 0.74 1 7
Fireplaces 0.79 0.62 0 5
Lot Area (SF) 7,256 4,440 1,000 43,560
Garage Stalls 2.01 0.86 0 5
Age 13.31 12.18 0 111
Time on Market 45.16 55.58 0 1,346
Pool 0.24 0.43 0 1 13,224
Vacant 0.37 0.48 0 1 20,323
Owner-Occupied 0.60 0.49 0 1 33,013
Tenant-Occupied 0.03 0.18 0 1 1,866
Notes: The total number of observations  55,202.
Data Subset Counts
2001 Sale Year, n  14,713
2002 Sale Year, n  19,203
2003 Sale Year, n  16,937
2004 Sale Year, n  4,349
Tenant Occupied (2001), n  481
Tenant Occupied (2002), n  543
Tenant Occupied (2003), n  571
Tenant Occupied (2004), n  271
occupied or vacant vs. an owner-occupied base condition). The model was
estimated simultaneously and iteratively with the corresponding full-sample TOM
model (Exhibit 4) using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). This will result in
more efﬁcient models than running the models separately when the model errors
are correlated.4 To control for selection bias in the rented subsample, each model
also includes an inverse Mills ratio (Mills) derived from a Probit model of a
dichotomous tenant-occupied dependent variable (Heckman, 1974).5 The Mills
ratio is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that the decision to rent a house is
affected by unobserved variables that are, as a whole, positively correlated with
its market price. The regression model explains about 82% of the variance in the
natural log of price, noting however that the R2 concept is not well deﬁned when
using GLS.6 The signs on the coefﬁcients were mostly as expected, considering
the typically high correlations among living area, bedroom and bath variables.
Two variables were not signiﬁcant in this model—bath count and TOM. However,30  Clauretie and Wolverton








Price* 173,431 184,834 220,164
(70,302) (76,866) (93,756)
Living Area (SF) 1,853 1,867 1,884
(669) (681) (683)
Bedrooms 3.40 3.39 3.37
(0.76) (0.77) (0.78)
Bathrooms 2.48 2.49 2.53
(0.67) (0.68) (0.83)
Fireplaces 0.84 0.82 0.75
(0.60) (0.62) (0.63)
Lot Area (SF) 7,420 7,391 7,022
(4,531) (4,530) (4,280)
Garage Stalls 2.00 2.00 2.03
(0.84) (0.84) (0.90)
Age 13.5 13.8 12.7
(11.9) (12.2) (12.3)
Time on Market* 47.4 52.9 36.6
(58.2) (57.4) (50.7)
Pool 0.25 0.25 0.23
(0.43) (0.43) (0.42)
Vacant 0.36 0.39 0.36
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Owner-Occupied 0.61 0.58 0.60
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Tenant-Occupied 0.03 0.03 0.04
(0.18) (0.17) (0.20)
Sample Size (n) 14,713 19,203 21,286
Notes: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcantly different at the .01 level.
the lack of signiﬁcance for TOM was discovered to be a data anomaly due to
offsetting effects of signiﬁcant positive and signiﬁcant negative TOM coefﬁcients
for subsets of the data (presented later in the paper).
Turning to the focus of this paper, the coefﬁcient on tenant occupancy was
signiﬁcant at the 1% level and negative (.1972), indicating that tenant-occupiedLeave Vacant or Rent  31
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Exhibit 3  House Price Model Using All Data—Dependent Variable Ln(Price)
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard Error Z-Statistic p-value
Constant 11.4652 0.00533 2151.30 .000
2002 Sale Year 0.0568 0.00169 33.63 .000
2003 Sale Year 0.1642 0.00174 94.16 .000
2004 Sale Year 0.3883 0.00269 144.35 .000
Living Area (SF) 0.0004 1.9E-06 204.88 .000
Baths 0.0012 0.00124 1.00 .317
Bedrooms 0.0644 0.00120 53.87 .000
Lot Area (SF) 8.5E-06 1.8E-07 29.12 .000
Fireplaces 0.014 0.00128 10.67 .000
Garage Stalls 0.034 0.00108 31.61 .000
Pool 0.082 0.00168 48.98 .000
Age 0.0067 0.00007 92.00 .000
Time on Market 0.00002 0.00001 1.55 .121
Vacant 0.0347 0.00140 24.83 .000
Tenant-Occupied 0.1972 0.02438 8.09 .000
Mills 0.0782 0.01055 7.41 .000
Notes: R2  .8213; n  55,202.
Exhibit 4  Time on Market Model Using All Data—Dependent Variable Time on Market (Days)
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard Error Z-Statistic p-value
Constant 3.493 1.032 3.39 .001
Living Area (SF) 0.017 0.0004 42.81 .000
Age 0.476 0.0195 24.42 .000
Vacant 8.939 0.4857 18.40 .000
Tenant-Occupied 66.43 7.716 8.61 .000
Positively Atypical 38.91 2.680 14.52 .000
Negatively Atypical 33.27 2.318 14.35 .000
Mills 28.36 3.331 8.51 .000
Notes: R2  .0596; n  55,202.32  Clauretie and Wolverton
homes sold for about 17.9% less than owner-occupied homes.7 This equates to
$34,980 less for the mean priced $195,418 house. Also, consistent with past
research ﬁndings, vacant homes sell for signiﬁcantly less than owner-occupied
homes (roughly 3.4% or $6,645 less for this data’s mean priced house).
The second criterion for determining whether to rent or leave a house vacant when
listed for sale is that renting the property ‘‘does not lead to a substantially longer
time on the market.’’ The SUR model regressed days on market against living
area and age, consistent with most TOM studies, as well as occupancy (vacant or
tenant occupied). Again, the model includes the inverse Mills ratio to control for
selection bias.
Additionally, for the TOM equations, two ‘‘new’’ variables are created that are
indicative of atypical characteristics or situations not evident from the data (e.g.,
seller motivation would be one of many factors expected to affect TOM). The
atypicality variables were created by dividing the price regression residuals into
those less than zero (positive atypicalities) and those greater than zero (negative
atypicalities). Thus, positive atypicalities are deﬁned as homes that sold for less
than the price model predicted (i.e., the buyer paid a less-than-market price
perhaps because of greater seller motivation). Negative atypicalities are deﬁned as
homes that sold for more than the price model predicted (i.e., the buyer paid
a greater-than-market price). Extreme values of this variable should capture
unknown and overpriced or unique property characteristics that would be expected
to lengthen TOM and/or low seller motivation reﬂected in aggressive pricing of
the property (i.e., overpricing). Because the measures of atypicality capture seller
motivation as well as unspeciﬁed, abnormal property characteristics, these
measures contain more information than previous atypicality measures, which
have focused only on the known physical characteristics of properties.
The results of the full-data TOM model are shown in Exhibit 4. The positive
coefﬁcients on living area and age are consistent with previous TOM studies. Also,
the atypicality variables are signiﬁcant and signed as expected. Conﬁrming prior
research, vacant homes took signiﬁcantly more time to sell (approximately nine
days more or a 20% increase in average TOM). Based on the model results, the
model’s implicit statistical null hypothesis—that there is no difference in days on
market for tenant-occupied homes than for owner-occupied homes—is rejected.
Hence, tenant occupancy does appear to lead to a signiﬁcant and substantially
longer TOM. Tenant occupancy adds approximately 66 days to TOM (a 147%
increase in average TOM) versus nine additional days for a vacant home.
Analysis of Data Subsets
Median home price studies by the Las Vegas Area Association of Realtors and
local media coverage indicate rapid home price escalation over the study period,
especially during 2003/2004. These claims are substantiated by the Exhibit 3 priceLeave Vacant or Rent  33
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model. Average home price moved upward by 5.84% in 2002 versus 2001. Price
increased again in 2003, up 17.85% from 2001 (or up 11.35% vs. 2002). Price
rose rapidly again in the early months of 2004, up 47.45% from 2001 (or up
25.12% from 2003). The data therefore provide an opportunity to look at the
tenant occupancy effects on price and TOM in a rapid price escalation
environment.
Exhibit 5 presents the empirical results of three SUR house price models, dividing
the data into 2001, 2002 and 2003/2004 subsets. The 2003/2004 subset is subject
to the data’s most extreme price escalation. As with the full data model, the price
models shown in Exhibit 5 include inverse Mills ratios derived from tenant-
occupied dependent variable Probit models speciﬁc to each data subset.
These models reveal differences in variable signs and signiﬁcance when 2003/
2004 is compared to the two relatively more-price-stable years. Time on market
is positively correlated with price in 2001 (signiﬁcant) and 2002 (not signiﬁcant),
consistent with the idea that higher seller reservation prices and longer seller
search times equate to higher realized prices. Conversely, and counter to search
theory implications, TOM is highly signiﬁcant and negatively correlated with price
in the 2003/2004 time period. This is consistent with local anecdotal evidence of
numerous houses that were listed for sale during this time period bringing multiple
offers and realizing prices in excess of the list price. In this sort of price escalation
environment, it may be that houses that do not sell quickly are being viewed as
‘‘problem homes.’’
With regard to the effects of tenant occupancy, this factor’s signiﬁcance varies by
time frame. Tenant occupancy was a moderately signiﬁcant price variable in 2001
and 2002 (p values of .088 and .082, respectively). And, tenant occupancy was
highly signiﬁcant during 2003/2004 when tenant-occupied homes sold for 27.2%
less. This equates to approximately $59,885 based on the data’s mean home price
of $220,164 during the 2003/2004 period.
Exhibit 6 shows the SUR time on market results for the three time period subsets.
As with the full data model, the TOM models shown in Exhibit 5 include inverse
Mills ratios derived from tenant-occupied dependent variable Probit models
speciﬁc to each data subset. These results again conﬁrm the positive correlation
between age and TOM and between living area and TOM. The vacant home effect
on TOM is signiﬁcant for all time periods and the coefﬁcient is fairly consistent
across time, varying from a little less than eight days longer to slightly more than
ten days longer. The atypicality variables are signiﬁcant in all time periods and
signed consistent with expectations. The signiﬁcance of these variables (size of
coefﬁcients and t-values) suggest that the measure of atypicality captures a
considerable amount of relevant information. Reasons for this could be a topic for
further study. Finally, tenant occupancy has a signiﬁcant and substantial effect on
TOM for all time periods. Time on market is extended by a range of about 48 to
97 days.34  Clauretie and Wolverton








Constant 11.3850 11.4944 11.7326
(1086) (1170) (1231)
Living Area (SF) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(107.7) (122.5) (112.5)
Baths 0.0027 0.0006 0.0024
(1.04) (0.27) (1.19)
Bedrooms 0.050 0.064 0.073
(22.57) (32.66) (31.91)
Lot Area (SF) 8.28E-06 8.84E-06 8.14E-06
(27.65) (32.75) (22.59)
Fireplaces 0.0095 0.015 0.011
(4.06) (7.16) (4.37)
Garage Stalls 0.044 0.042 0.025
(21.3) (21.79) (12.82)
Pool 0.079 0.080 0.079
(27.7) (30.52) (23.00)
Age 0.0049 0.0057 0.0082
(36.74) (47.13) (58.83)
Time on Market 0.0001 0.00002 0.0005
(4.93) (1.09) (20.21)
Vacant 0.034 0.036 0.029
(13.74) (16.81) (10.34)
Tenant-Occupied* 0.085 0.092 0.318
(1.71) (1.74) (7.67)
Mills 0.054 0.029 0.152
(2.51) (1.28) (8.28)
R2 0.8185 0.8249 0.7458
Notes: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. For the 2001 Coefﬁcient, n  14,713; 2002
Coefﬁcient, n  19,203; 2003/2004 Coefﬁcient, n  21,286.
*Tenant occupancy is signiﬁcant at the .10 level in 2001 and 2002, and at the .01 level in
2003/2004.Leave Vacant or Rent  35
JRER  Vol. 28  No. 1 – 2006








Constant 2.60 0.470 6.57
(1.23) (0.26) (4.21)
Living Area (SF) 0.019 0.020 0.014
(22.55) (27.30) (23.14)
Age 0.289 0.370 0.650
(7.21) (10.88) (22.75)
Vacant 7.79 7.63 10.16
(7.90) (9.12) (14.10)
Tenant-Occupied* 65.54 97.27 48.44
(3.87) (5.86) (4.83)
Positively Atypical 76.31 66.75 28.20
(11.81) (12.44) (7.52)
Negatively Atypical 28.01 22.30 20.76
(6.98) (6.65) (6.95)
Mills 26.69 37.56 22.87
(3.65) (5.36) (5.15)
R2 0.0677 0.0659 0.0584
Notes: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. For the 2001 Coefﬁcient, n  14,713; 2002
Coefﬁcient, n  19,203; 2003/2004 Coefﬁcient, n  21,286.
*Tenant occupancy is signiﬁcant at the .01 level in all time periods.
 Conclusion
The results and Equation (3) (over the entire period) are used to calculate the
(net) wealth position from the rent versus vacant decision of the home seller. The
results in Exhibit 4 indicate that renting the property versus leaving it vacant will
have a signiﬁcant effect on the number of days it will be on the market—
approximately 66 additional days. Furthermore, the effect on the selling price is
also substantial. When compared to owner-occupancy, renting the property will
reduce its value by $34,980 versus a reduction of $6,645 for leaving it vacant.
The net effect is a price reduction of $28,335 (Hr  Hv). Now, while the property
is available for sale, the owner will incur a carrying cost and, if rented, receive
rental income. The carrying cost is estimated to be 1% of the value of the property
per month.8 For the average priced property, this translates into a daily cost of
$64.36  Clauretie and Wolverton
Next, forty-three houses advertised for rent in the Las Vegas area in 2003 were
surveyed. The average rent for a property of the average size in the sample was
approximately $45 per day.9 Renting an otherwise vacant property added 57.49
days to the TOM (66.43  8.94). The average days on the market for rented
properties was 106 days.10 The second term in Equation (3) is, thus, $4,770 ($45
 106) and the third term is $3,679 ($64  57.49). The value of Equation (3) is:
 $28,335  $4,770 $3,679  $27,224. Renting a property may cost the
home seller as much as 14% of the average priced property.
The evidence suggests that renting an otherwise vacant property is not an optimal
decision. Perhaps properties do not ‘‘show’’ well when occupied by a renter. The
typical renter may not take good care of the property. Also, a renter may be
reluctant to allow the property to be shown or marketed efﬁciently. Renters know
that when the property is sold they will have to incur moving costs and so, gain
nothing from aiding the sale of the property. More research should be conducted
in this area. Additional research could explore the agency problems that exist when
a property is rented, agency problems that extend the time on the market and
result in a lower selling price.
 Endnotes
1 A time when market interest rates were high and low-rate assumable loans were
available, 1976–1977.
2 Because the time period a house is on the market is relatively short, discounting and
present value analysis were omitted.
3 Occupancy status is stated on the MLS listing sheet. Occupancy status can change and
such changes are reﬂected by amending the listing information. For example, an owner-
occupied house is recategorized as vacant in the MLS listing if the owner moves out
while the property is being offered for sale. Denoting occupancy as owner, tenant, or
vacant reﬂects the occupancy status of the property at the time the purchaser viewed the
property and made the offer to purchase.
4 A Breusch-Pagan test of the independence of the error terms of each of the four
seemingly unrelated price and TOM models indicates that the 2001 and 2002 models
are not independent, supporting the use of seemingly unrelated regression. Separate OLS
models were run as well, and the variable signs, coefﬁcients, signiﬁcance levels and
corresponding inferences were similar to the results reported herein.
5 The probit model used was tenant occupancy  f(baths, bedrooms, living area,
ﬁreplaces, garage stalls, lot size, pool, age). All but pool and lot size were signiﬁcant
predictors of tenant occupancy, with larger and older homes signiﬁcantly less likely to
be tenant occupied. The probit estimate was derived using the TSP program, which has
built in exclusions for, and will not identify, models having missing values or complete
or quasi-complete sample separation by a single predictor variable.
6 The R
2 statistics reported herein are similar to those found in the separate,
heteroscedasticity-consistent, OLS models run on price and TOM.
7 The interpretation (effect) of the coefﬁcient on a dummy variable in a log model is: e
 1 (see Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). For small values of , the effect is close to
the coefﬁcient. The discrepancy is greater for larger coefﬁcients.Leave Vacant or Rent  37
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8 Carrying costs include the mortgage payment, property taxes, maintenance, utilities and
hazard insurance.
9 A regression of the monthly rent and square feet of the forty-three properties produced
the equation: Rent  536  .45 * SQFT (adjusted R
2  .24). For a house with 1,848
square feet, the estimated rent would be $1,366 per month or $45 per day.
10 The average number of days on the market for rented properties (106 days) is calculated
from information on the average days for all properties (45.16) and the percentages in
the sample of properties that were owner-occupied (59.8%), vacant (36.8%) or rented
(3.4%).
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